Decision Sciences
8 years ago

Mechanism Design Breakthrough Solves Implementation Problem, Enabling Unique Equilibrium Outcomes

Journal of Political Economy
Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem
Thomas R. Palfrey, Sanjay Srivastava

Paper Summary

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The study shows that in certain situations, the problem of multiple outcomes in mechanism design can be avoided by ensuring that players don't choose weak strategies. This means that in some cases, a fair rule can be the only outcome of a mechanism. The researchers found a condition that must be met for this unique outcome to happen, and this condition is more specific for private-value situations compared to common-value scenarios.