Decision Sciences
8 years ago

First price auctions outperform second price auctions, reducing collusion risks.

Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions with Reserve Prices
Wayne-Roy Gayle

Paper Summary

A program was created to solve auction problems with different bidders and reserve prices. The program showed that in some cases, first price auctions make more money for the seller than second price auctions. This is especially true when bidders have different values for the item being auctioned.

Related papers

Decision Sciences
8 years ago

First-price auctions outperform second-price auctions in revenue generation with differential information.

Mechanism Design
Economic Analysis
Network Formation
1 view
Decision Sciences
4 years ago

Stochastic value changes in auctions can decrease bidder payoffs significantly.

Mechanism Design
Economic Behavior
Monetary Models
1 view
Decision Sciences
5 years ago

Auctions Revolutionized: Maximizing Revenue and Welfare for All Bidders

Mechanism Design
Economic Analysis
Network Formation