Decision Sciences
8 years ago

Bidders Get Aggressive to Beat Collusion in Auctions with Reserve Price.

Zhongguo guanli kexue
Equilibrium Analysis of Bidder Collusion Based on the Second-price Pre-auction Knockout
GU Qiao-ming

Paper Summary

The article explores how bidders collude in auctions using a specific strategy. It finds that non-colluding bidders bid more aggressively to compete with colluding bidders. Also, the auctioneer's reserve price can impact bidder collusion.

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