Social Sciences
7 years ago

Inequity-averse principals lead to better outcomes for self-regarding agents.

International Journal of Economic Theory
Other‐regarding principal and moral hazard: The single‐agent case
Swapnendu Banerjee, Mainak Sarkar

Paper Summary

Related papers

Decision Sciences
4 years ago

Study reveals how limited liability leads to efficient agent pooling.

Mechanism Design
Economic Analysis
Economic Behavior
2 views
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
4 years ago

Limited liability contracts lead to lower effort and suboptimal outcomes.

Monetary Models
Economic Analysis
Public Finance
2 views
Decision Sciences
4 years ago

Limited liability hinders optimal outcomes in moral hazard situations.

Mechanism Design
Monetary Models
Economic Analysis
2 views

The article explores how different types of bosses can affect employees' behavior. When a boss cares about fairness, employees are more motivated to work hard. Employees also prefer bosses who care about fairness over those who care about status. The study shows that when both boss and employee care about fairness, the work environment improves.