Decision Sciences
7 years ago

Small fines and noisy inspections make truth-telling the norm in social choices.

Mathematical Social Sciences
Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide
Marcelo Caffera, Juan Dubra, Nicolás Figueroa

Paper Summary

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Players can achieve socially desirable outcomes even when they have private information and similar preferences. By using small fines and noisy inspections, the desired outcome can be fully implemented, with truth-telling being the best strategy.