Economics, Econometrics and Finance
7 years ago

Unveiling the Flaw in Implementing First-Best Payoff in Contracts

SSRN Electronic Journal
Informed Principal, Moral Hazard, and Limited Liability
Teddy Mekonnen

Paper Summary

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