Computer Science
6 years ago

New logic reveals who's truly to blame in strategic games.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Blameworthiness in Games with Imperfect Information.
Pavel Naumov, Tao Jia

Paper Summary

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Blameworthiness in games with imperfect information is determined by whether a group of players could have prevented an outcome and if they knew how to do so. A new logic system was developed to show how knowledge and responsibility interact in these games.