Decision Sciences
5 years ago

New strategy for cooperative games could revolutionize pollution control efforts!

Operations Research Letters
Strongly strategic support of cooperative solutions for games over event trees
Lei Wang, Cui Liu, Hongwei Gao, Chong Lin

Paper Summary

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The article discusses how to support cooperative solutions in dynamic games played over event trees. They introduce a new concept called S-adapted subgame-perfect strong ε-Nash equilibrium. They show that a trigger strategy profile can be an S-adapted subgame-perfect strong ε-Nash equilibrium under certain conditions. An example of a pollution control game with stochastic absorption is provided.