Economics, Econometrics and Finance
5 years ago

New mechanism ensures fair assignments without compromising agents' preferences!

SSRN Electronic Journal
A Planner-Optimal Matching Mechanism and Its Incentive Compatibility in a Restricted Domain
Shunya Noda

Paper Summary

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The article shows how a new matching mechanism can achieve specific goals even when they don't match agents' preferences. By following certain rules, the mechanism can be fair and encourage honest behavior from participants. The researchers found that the mechanism they studied, called CRSD, is effective in achieving these goals while being fair to everyone involved.