Economics, Econometrics and Finance
4 years ago

Majority rule in bargaining leads to unique but inefficient outcomes.

Journal of Economic Theory
Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining
Hülya Eraslan, Antonio Merlo

Paper Summary

Related papers

Decision Sciences
2 years ago

Credible equilibrium ensures strategic credibility in multi-stage games.

Network Formation
Organized Crime
1 view
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
4 years ago

Bargaining power shifts lead to unequal outcomes in multilateral negotiations.

Mechanism Design
Infrastructure Impact
Policy Reform
1 view
Decision Sciences
4 years ago

New game theory concept challenges traditional equilibrium models, changing strategic decisions.

Network Formation
Monetary Models
Mechanism Design

The article explores how groups of players make decisions in a random setting where they have to agree on proposals. The researchers found that when not everyone has to agree, the outcomes can vary and may not always be the best for everyone involved. They also discovered that even when there is only one possible outcome, it may not be the most efficient one.