Social Sciences
4 years ago

Binding Contracts Could Disrupt Fair Distribution of Rights

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Coase theorem and exchangeable rights in non-cooperative games
Enrico Guzzini, Antonio Palestrini

Paper Summary

Related papers

Economics, Econometrics and Finance
4 years ago

Transaction Costs Can Unlock Stable Bargaining for Three Parties

Economic Analysis
Mechanism Design
Market Dynamics
3 views
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
4 years ago

Polluters Prefer Sequential Bargaining, Harming Victims' Welfare

Mechanism Design
Economic Analysis
Market Dynamics
1 view
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
4 years ago

Bargaining Beats Regulations: Coase Theorem Unlocks Efficient Environmental Solutions

Economic Analysis
Law and Economics
1 view

The article explores how different types of contracts affect the final distribution of property rights in non-cooperative games. It shows that with temporary contracts, individual rights may not converge to an efficient outcome.