Social Sciences
4 years ago

New Study Reveals Virtual Bayesian Implementation Key for Fair Social Choices

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra

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Virtual Bayesian implementation in social choice functions is achievable by satisfying incentive compatibility and virtual monotonicity, a weaker condition than Bayesian monotonicity. Virtual monotonicity is typically met in environments with at least three alternatives, making virtual Bayesian implementation successful in most cases with only incentive compatibility required.