Decision Sciences
4 years ago

Direct mechanisms fail to implement social choice functions, revelation principle challenged.

1 view
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
A Bayesian implementable social choice function cannot be implemented by a direct mechanism
Haoyang Wu

Paper Summary

The article shows that a social choice function that can be implemented in a certain way cannot be implemented in a different way. This is because in one way, agents have to pay a cost, but in the other way, they don't have to pay anything. This means that a fundamental theorem in economics doesn't work in this case.

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