Social Sciences
4 years ago

Cooperation thrives in games with strategic substitutes, boosting joint-payoff choices!

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cooperation in infinitely repeated games of strategic complements and substitutes
Ayşe Gül Mermer, Wieland Müller, Sigrid Suetens

Paper Summary

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The experiment studied how cooperation changes in repeated games with different strategies. Players were more cooperative at the start when strategies were substitutes rather than complements. This is because it's safer to cooperate with substitutes. However, cooperation levels balanced out over time due to players reacting to each other's moves.