Decision Sciences
4 years ago

FCC auctions set to prevent collusion and speed up completion time.

1 view
Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions
Peter Cramton, John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel R. Vincent, Robert Wilson

Paper Summary

The article discusses ways to improve FCC auctions by preventing collusion among bidders and making the auction process faster. The researchers suggest changes to the current auction rules to achieve these goals. The enhancements proposed in the report aim to streamline the auction process, allowing large auctions to be completed more quickly without losing efficiency.

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