Decision Sciences
3 years ago

Players in repeated games achieve common knowledge, changing game dynamics forever.

SSRN Electronic Journal
Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games
Takuo Sugaya, Yuichi Yamamoto

Paper Summary

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Players in repeated games can learn about the game's unknown state through noisy signals. For most signal distributions, players can cooperate and reach optimal outcomes. In these scenarios, players commonly learn the state, making it widely known among them.