Decision Sciences
3 years ago

Agents in Auctions Caught in Deception, Changing Game Dynamics

Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2022
Auctions between Regret-Minimizing Agents
Yoav Kolumbus, Noam Nisan

Paper Summary

Related papers

Decision Sciences
8 years ago

Different auction mechanisms impact seller revenue, influencing online auction efficiency.

Mechanism Design
Economic Analysis
Network Formation
2 views
Decision Sciences
10 months ago

Sponsored Search Auctions Vulnerable to Buyer Manipulation, Hurting Seller Revenue

Mechanism Design
Economic Analysis
Crowdsourcing Research
3 views
Decision Sciences
4 years ago

Auction Bidders Beware: Winning Curse Haunts Property Prices

Mechanism Design
3 views

The article explores how software agents using regret-minimizing algorithms behave in auctions. They looked at different types of auctions and found that in second-price auctions, players have reasons to lie about their valuations, while in first-price auctions, it's best to tell the truth.