Decision Sciences
4 years ago

Bidding rings more stable in English auctions, boosting efficiency and revenue.

2 views
International Journal of Industrial Organization
Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions
Jeroen Hinloopen, Sander Onderstal, Leonard Treuren

Paper Summary

The study compared bidding rings in two types of auctions: first-price sealed-bid and English auctions. They found that bidding rings were more stable in the English auction. However, the first-price sealed-bid auction made more money on average and had a wider range of revenue. The English auction was more efficient overall.

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